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Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical diﬀerentiation, we show that
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the ﬁrst entrant
supplies a lower quality and gains higher proﬁts than the second entrant.
We also prove that this entry sequence is socially eﬃcient.
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According to the established wisdom concerning vertically diﬀerentiated mar-
kets, earlier entrants appropriate the high-quality niches, while later entrants
ﬁll the remaining lower part of the quality spectrum (Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992;
Aoki and Prusa, 1997; Lehmann-Grube, 1997). This is due to two basic as-
sumptions according to which the distribution of cumsumers’ willingness to
pay is uniform and the game unravels in a single period, so that earlier en-
trants ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to serve high-income consumers, irrespectively
of the diﬀerent assumptions concerning full vs partial market coverage, or
the shape of the cost function, that characterise the aforementioned contri-
butions.1
Here, we want to relax the second assumption, by adopting a simple two-
period setup, with sequential entry.2 Using a model with convex costs whose
original formulation is in Cremer and Thisse (1991), we show that explicitly
accounting for the monopoly phase suﬃces to show that proﬁti n c e n t i v e sd r i v e
ﬁrms toward a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the ﬁrst entrant
supplies a lower quality and gains higher proﬁts as compared to the second
entrant. The straightforward intuition behind this result is that a reduction
in production costs, combined with ad interim monopoly power, makes it
attractive for the ﬁrst entrant to oﬀer a low-quality good. That is, the ﬁrst
entrant produces a low-quality product because the associated reduction in
1Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) show that there may exist a second-mover (low-
quality) advantage in an innovation race.
2In the above mentioned literature, entry is euristically considered in one-shot games,
without allowing any explicit role for calendar time. One exception is Dutta et al. (1995)
where, however, a high-quality advantage obtains.
1costs overcompensates the losses incurred in the second period, when the
market becomes a duopoly and the second entrant supplies a superior variety.
Moreover, we also prove that this entry sequence is socially eﬃcient, in that
it entails a higher average quality level than the alternative one.
The remainder of the note is structured as follows. The setup and the
static benchmark cases are laid out in section 2. The entry process and the
welfare performance are investigated in section 3. Section 4 contains some
concluding remarks.
2T h e m o d e l
We borrow the demand and cost setup from Cremer and Thisse (1991, 1994)
and Lambertini (1996), inter alia. The market exists over two periods, t ∈
{0,1}. Discounting of proﬁts and consumer surplus is measured by the rate
ρ ∈ [0,∞). In each period, a population of consumer of unit size is uniformly








measures a consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for quality, and the net
surplus from consumption is:
U = θqi − pi ≥ 0 (1)
where pi and qi are the price and quality of the product supplied by ﬁrm
i. We conﬁne our attention to the case where (1) holds for all consumers in
both periods, so that the market is always fully covered irrespective of the
market regime. In the remainder, we will appropriately discuss the suﬃcient
conditions for full market coverage to hold in every market regime.
On the supply side, any ﬁrm i must bear total cost Ci = cq2
ixi per period,
where xi is the market demand for her product and c is a positive parameter.
2Accordingly, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function is πi =( pi − cq2
i)xi in each period.
In the remainder, we will consider the following game:
• Each ﬁrm irreversibly sets quality at the time of entry.
• At t =0 , the ﬁrm 1 enters and remains a monopolist in that period.
• At t =1 , ﬁrm 2 enters and the market becomes a duopoly.
Hence, the problem of the ﬁrst entrant (the leader) consists in choosing
whether to oﬀer a low- or a high-quality good, correctly anticipating the
optimal behaviour of the second entrant (the follower). That is, the stage
describing quality choices is going to be solved àl aStackelberg. Once both
qualities are set, simultaneous Bertrand competition takes place. The so-
lution concept, as usual, is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward
induction.

















1 = pM − cq2
1 are monopoly proﬁts at t =0 ,π D
1 =( p1 − cq2
1)x1
are duopoly proﬁts at t =1 , the latter being discounted by the factor δ ≡
1/(1 + ρ), with δ ∈ [0,1] for all ρ ∈ [0,∞). The objective of the follower
(ﬁrm 2) consists in maximising duopoly proﬁts πD
2 =( p2 − cq2
2)x2 w.r.t. p2
and q2.
In the second period, the two ﬁrms will supply qualities qH ≥ qL > 0 at
duopoly prices pH ≥ pL, and either q1 = qL; q2 = qH or the opposite. In





3will be indiﬀerent between the two goods, so that we may deﬁne duopoly
d e m a n d sa sf o l l o w s :











2.1 Optimal myopic behaviour
Here we describe the optimal static behaviour in the cases of (i) monopoly
and (ii) duopoly with sequential play, to be used as a benchmark for the
subsequent analysis of the dynamic game.
Optimal monopoly pricing can be quickly characterised, for any given q1.
Under full coverage, ﬁrm 1 sets the price driving to zero the net surplus of























Observe that qM is the quality preferred by the poorest consumer in the
market.3 This is clearly due to the monopolist’s incentive to distort quality
downwards (Spence, 1975; Mussa and Rosen, 1978, inter alia). As shown in
Lambertini (1997a), full coverage emerges at the static monopoly optimum
provided that θ ≥ 3.




. His preferred quality qθ maximises his
net surplus when he is able to purchase such quality at marginal cost, that is
qθ =a r gm a x
q U = θq − cq2
which yields qθ = θ/(2c) (see Cremer and Thisse, 1991, 1994). Accordingly, qM coincides
with the quality that the poorest consumer indexed by θ −1 would purchase under either
social planning or perfect competition.
4The simultaneous game in prices is also well known; therefore we omit
the detailed exposition (see Cremer and Thisse, 1991, 1994; and Lambertini,
1996, inter alia). Equilibrium prices are:
pH =

























Hence, we have two alternative scenarios. The ﬁrst, where q1 = qL and
q2 = qH, is labelled as low-quality leadership; the second, where q1 = qH
and q2 = qL, is labelled as high-quality leadership. Before proceeding to the
exposition of the entry games in the two-period model, it can be useful to
expose the essential features of the Stackelberg outcomes at the ﬁrst stage
of the static (single-period) game, based upon proﬁt functions (7). This




/(2c) which corresponds to the quality preferred by the average (or
median) consumer (see fn. 4). This holds irrespectively of whether the leader
is the high- or the low-quality ﬁrm: for the ﬁrst entrant, it is always optimal
to locate in the middle of the space of consumer preferences (see Lambertini,
1996, 1997b). Then, the follower maximises proﬁts by choosing the best

























































which are always positive. Then, it can be easily checked that
π∗





















Accordingly, we may state:
Lemma 1 In the single-period Stackelberg game, the leader prefers to sup-
ply the high-quality good, while the follower prefers to supply the low-quality






This is in line with the acquired wisdom (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979;
Shaked and Sutton, 1983). As to the social standpoint, we may evaluate the
social welfare function deﬁned as the sum of industry proﬁts and consumer
surplus:




(sqi − pi)ds +
Z θ
e θ
(sqj − pj)ds, i,j =1 ,2;i 6= j (12)
in the two cases, for θ ∈ (1,2). By doing so, we ﬁnd:

















/2 ∼ = 3.098. This proves:
Lemma 2 In the parameter range where both outcomes are admissible, i.e.,
for all θ ∈ (1,2), social welfare is higher when the leader supplies the low-
quality good.
6This is clearly due to the fact that social welfare increases with the av-
erage quality supplied to the market. Additionally, Lemmata 1-2 entail that
there exists a conﬂict between private and social incentives as to the quality
spectrum selected through the sequence of moves. Our aim in the remainder
of the paper is precisely that of showing that a slightly more realistic setup
where the entry process is explicitly sketched may indeed produce drastically
diﬀerent results.
3 A two-period game with entry
In order to ensure the attainment of full market coverage in both games, we
introduce the following:
Assumption θ ≥ 3.
In particular, as stated in the previous section, this is necessary and
suﬃcient to ensure that all consumers be able to buy at the static monopoly
equilibrium. Consequently, given that any further entry entails that prices
are lower than at the monopoly optimum, it is suﬃcient to yield full coverage
in correspondence of any duopolistic equilibrium, be that considered either
in a static or in a dynamic game. The assumption is in fact suﬃcient but not
necessary to ensure that the outcomes of the dynamic entry game exposed
in the remainder are admissible. Intuitively, the condition θ ≥ 3 is slack for
all ﬁnite values of the discount rate ρ, since only in the limit case where ρ is
inﬁnitely high the dynamic game replicates the static monopoly equilibrium.4
4Spelling out the speciﬁc conditions to be met in the dynamic entry games would require
numerical calculations involving θ and ρ w h i c hw el e a v ea s i d ef o rt h es a k eo fs i m p l i f y i n g
the exposition.
73.1 Low-quality leadership
In this case, the ﬁrst entrant supplies a low-quality good. Therefore, πD
1 = πL
and πD

























H into Π1L and solving the ﬁrst order condition (FOC) ∂Π1L/∂qL =
0 w.r.t. qL, we obtain:
qL =
16θ − 81ρ − 113 ± 3
p
9ρ(81ρ + 194) + 1081
32c
. (15)


























the latter being the single-period optimal monopoly quality qM, i.e., as ρ →
∞ the ﬁrst entrant behaves as if it were always a monopolist. Therefore, the
Stackelberg equilibrium qualities are:
ql
L =
16θ − 81ρ − 113 + 3
p





16θ − 27(1 + ρ)+
p
9ρ(81ρ + 194) + 1081
32c
(18)
where superscripts l and f stand for leader and follower, respectively. Com-
paring (18) with qM, the following can be easily acertained:









L >q M for all ρ ∈ [0,∞).
That is, the leader chooses a quality level that, for any ﬁnite discount rate,
is higher than the single-period monopoly quality. This is due to the fact
that the ﬁrst entrant anticipates that the follower will locate further up in
the quality spectrum, and therefore raises its own quality level as compared










(1 + ρ) − ρ
¡
19683ρ






































2 + 78489ρ + 105417
¢
− 47635. (21)
The expression on the r.h.s. of (21) has no real roots w.r.t. θ. Hence, given
that the coeﬃcient of θ is positive, we have that Π∗
1L−π∗
H/(1 + ρ) > 0, which
proves the Lemma.
This shows that entering ﬁrst with a low-quality good ultimately mat-
ters more than supplying the high-quality good later on, when the market
9becomes a duopoly. The source of this result is twofold: ﬁrst, the earlier en-





¢2 . This must be contrasted with the traditional claim inherited
from previous literature in this ﬁeld based upon static games (see, e.g., Gab-
szewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1983), whereby higher quality
niches should be more proﬁtable than inferior ones, as we have summarised
in section 1.2.






















Now we have πD
1 = πH and πD
























6Also in this case, there exists another solution to ∂πL/∂qL =0 , i.e., qL =
¡
θ − 2 − cqH
¢
/c. Again, this can be excluded on the basis of second order conditions.
Moreover, leapfrogging on the part of the follower can also be excluded. The proof of the
absence of any incentive to leapfrog the leader’s quality is omitted for brevity, although
available from the authors upon request.





16θ +2 7 ρ +1 1−
p




16θ +8 1 ρ +9 7− 3
p
9ρ(81ρ + 226) + 1369
32c
(24)
As in the previous case, also here the quality of the leader converges to the








This amounts to saying that, if the discount rate is inﬁnitely high, the high-
quality ﬁr mb e h a v e sa si fs h es t o o di nt h em a r k e ta l o n ei nb o t hp e r i o d s .
Moreover, comparing (24) with qM, we obtain:
Lemma 5 ql
H >q M >q
f
L for all ρ ∈ [0,∞).
Here, unlike the previous case, we observe that the low-quality good lies
below qM for all ﬁnite values of the discount rate. This is due to the interplay
between the strategic complementarity characterising qualities and the need
to diﬀerentiate products in order to soften price competition in duopoly. In
choosing the optimal quality level, the leader must take into account two
opposite forces: one is the incentive to raise quality in order to (i) attain a
l a r g ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation and (ii) eliminate the possibility of leapfrogging
by the second entrant in the second period; the other is the incentive to keep
as close as possible to qM with a view to increasing its own ability to explot
monopoly power in the ﬁrst period. The latter eﬀect is to be held responsible
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9ρ(81ρ + 226) + 1369. As in the previous case, we can prove
that a ﬁrst-mover advantage operates:
Lemma 6 Π∗
1H >π ∗




















2 + 86265ρ + 124425
¢
− 58887. (28)
The expression on the r.h.s. of (28) has no real roots w.r.t. θ. Hence, given
that the coeﬃcient of θ is positive, we have that Π∗
1H−π∗
L/(1 + ρ) > 0, which
proves the Lemma.
As in the previous case, also here the ﬁrst entrant’s proﬁts are larger than
the second entrant’s. In this setting, the reason appears to be that the initial
monopoly proﬁts add to the fact that the leader will enjoy an advantageous
position when the rival enters from below and the market becomes a duopoly.





















123.3 The subgame perfect equilibrium and welfare as-
sessment
In order to complete the characterisation of the subgame perfect equilibrium,
it suﬃces to compare expressions (19-20) and (26-27). Proceeding as in the









L for all ρ ∈ [0,∞). (30)
This holds for any admissible value of θ. Accordingly, we may state:
Proposition 7 In the whole admissible parameter range, the ﬁrst entrant
prefers to supply a low-quality good, while the second entrant prefers to supply
a high-quality good. Therefore, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and
involves q1 = ql
L; q2 = q
f
H.
This is in sharp contrast with the previous wisdom in this ﬁeld, which
maintained that the ﬁrst entrant would ﬁnd it most proﬁtable to ﬁll the high-
quality niche (see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton,
1982, 1983; Lehmann-Grube, 1997). The novelty of our result simply comes
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a tw eh a v ee x p l i c i t l ya l l o w e df o ram o n o p o l yp e r i o db e f o r e
the formation of a duopoly. By supplying a low-quality good, the ﬁrst entrant
reduces costs (which are quadratic in the quality level), and the possibility of
enjoying monopoly power in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dm o r et h a no ﬀsets the decrease
in proﬁts associated with being the low-quality supplier in the next one.
We may also compare the degrees of diﬀerentiation associated with the




















13is positive, increasing and concave in ρ, for all ρ ∈ [0,∞);moreover, if ρ =0















Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 8 Product diﬀerentiation is larger if the leader provides the
low-quality product, than conversely.
The reason for this result is that ql
H >q l
H >q M, i.e., the leader comes
closer to the pure monopoly quality when supplying the low quality rather
than the high one. Put diﬀerently, choosing to enter ﬁrst with the high
quality prevents the leader from appropriately exploiting monopoly power in
the ﬁrst period. Since distorting quality downwards is inherent to the nature
of a monopolist, by entering with the low-quality good the leader gets two
eggs in one basket: it enhances surplus extraction through monopoly pricing
in the ﬁrst period and it prepares to the opening of the duopoly phase, where
the resulting product diﬀerentiation will be large enough to keep prices well
above marginal costs.
N o ww ep a s so nt oe x a m i n et h ew e l f a r ep e r f o r m a n c eo ft h em a r k e ti nt h e
two cases, in order to verify whether the conclusion reached in the single-
period game (Lemma 2) is robust to the introduction of a monopoly phase.
This last step is needed to clarify what kind of social preferences there exist
concerning the entry process over the entire time span, and therefore whether
a planner or a policy maker should worry at all about the evolution of the


























The relevant equilibrium expressions can be calculated using the equilibrium
values of prices and qualities in the two settings, to obtain:
Proposition 9 Discounted social welfare is higher when the leader chooses
to oﬀer the low-quality good than the high-quality one, for all admissible
values of ρ and θ.
Therefore, the equivalent of Lemma 2 cannot hold in the two-period game,
as here there is no conﬂict between private and social incentives as to the
sequence of entry. The reason is that average quality is higher when the













/2, which, on the basis of Proposition 8, is always
positive in the admissible parameter range.
4 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a simple model of sequential entry in a market for vertically
diﬀerentiated goods, showing that, if the monopoly power enjoyed ad interim
by the ﬁrst entrant is properly accounted for, then the entry game produces
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the ﬁrst and second entrants
prefer to supply the low- and the high-quality good, respectively. Then, we
have shown that there is no conﬂict between private and social incentives,
since welfare is higher when the ﬁrst entrant supplies the low-quality good,
than in the opposite case.
15We have carried out our analysis under convex variable costs of quality
improvement, full market coverage and a two-period model. A desirable
extension of the present model would consist in relaxing either assumption
(or all of them) to test for the robustness of our conclusions.
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